INTRODUCTION
The driving force behind the economics of the information technology industry has been the ability to integrate ever more tightly electronic circuitry. This integration has taken place since the first transistorized computer in the late 1950s. VLSI circuits with as much as 1,000,000 active elements are now being produced with further breakthroughs promised for the next decade. This has resulted in a unique economic circumstance ---an industry that improves its fundamental technological cost performance at 30% to 40% compounded annually and has been doing so for three decades with more to come.
Similarly just as integration has fueled the economics of the information technology revolution, information technology is also driving new and powerful forms of integration in companies that are enabling them to radically reduce the cost of the primary business transactions and to secure important strategic advantages.
Integration as we have defined it --integration of multiple classes of transaction data, integration of multiple forms of data representation, integration of knowledge, and integration of group communications--is enabled by two dominant properties of information technology: improved interconnection, and improved shared data accessability. The ability to create new forms of integration at any of the four levels described lets the designer build the infrastructure of organizational design and business process appropriate to the strategy.
In this paper we argue:
That information technology and its driving cost performance imperative has changed traditional labor-to-capital-goods price ratios opening up opportunities for radical change in organizations and process, and that these opportunities are being used to generate strategic advantage applications.
That different forms of integration realized through two key aspects of information technology ----improved interconnection, and larger, more complete data bases----are often the basis for deriving strategic advantage.
That a search strategy for finding strategic advantage applications can be developed by an understanding of the possibilities afforded by integration.
The business press and journals have w ly disseminated the idea that information technology is a driving force for enabling competitive strategy. An abundance of examples have been described [61 . What is not well understood is that the driving force of the information technology revolution is a changed economic relationship between capital and labor prices caused by several generations of prodigious performance improvements in the building block information technologies (memories and computational components). This changed economic relationship is reflected in the enormous drop in the relative price of Information Technology capital goods compared to other capital goods produced and provides an undeniable economic imperative.* Historically labor and capital goods prices tend to move similarly over time. We have found a very modest improvement in the capital goods to labor price relationship for six different product groups (processed foods, appliances, furniture, *Our appreciation to Gary Loveman at MIT for providing the insights of an economist to this argument. machinery and equipment, cars, and photographic equipment) over the three decades starting in 1950. To provide an understanding of this change, we define a ratio, the capital equivalency ratio, to be the cost of a technology divided by the cost of labor. The capital equivalency ratio for these six product groups, averaged over all the groups, improved 1.4 times. The best improvement of any of the product groups for a ten year period was 1.7 times.
Apparently unique is the history of the Information Technology Industry which, due to its cost performance improvement for basic technologies of over 30% per annum [51 since the 1950s, shows a dramatic change in the ratio between labor and the price of information technology capital goods (see Figure 1 following).
Taking a typical ten year period, this 30% per annum information technology cost improvement coupled with a 5% per annum increase in labor cost gives a capitar equivalency ratio for information technology, which by the end of the ten year period has improved 25 times. The dramatic difference between these two curves suggests the existence of enormous potential for those organizations willing to seize the opportunity. The accounting era, typified by stand alone applications that implemented traditional functional processes; applications such as payroll, accounts payable, and general ledger.
The operations era, typified by applications that were direct elements of key operational processes such as order entry, and manufacturing control.
*Apple, Sun, and Xerox trademarks.
The information era, typified by a whole new range of applications, such as decision support systems, end user computing, and electronic mail.
The knowledge era where expert systems are allowing us to capture qualitative knowledge and exploit it with new forms of systems architecture.
2. It has enabled relatively consistent progress to be made in a number of related technology areas each of which reinforces the functionality of the other and extend the range of implementable applications. These are areas such as:
computer-processing, personal computers and workstations, telecom--munications, software, file storage, robotics, special purpose chips and so forth. The view of the founder of Batterymarch, Dean LeBaron, is that the "investment firm of the future will be a few senior people and one big machine." These senior people are to be used in managing a value added chain "that disaggregates the firm into the technological and economically distinct activities it performs in competing in a particular industry." [17] . For Batterymarch the value added chain was more streamlined than that of the traditional large financial management company. The Investment Process: Here information technology is used to assist the 12 portfolio strategists to develop research themes, by using the firms's data bases and models to screen for stocks with required characteristics and to determine correlations and to build proposed models of security behavior. When an investment strategy is agreed upon, the entire data base is searched for a universe of stocks that are then screened by the portfolio strategists before
finally being put on an approved buy list. Because of the computer use, coverage is not limited by the amount of people to do research, but rather can be expanded as better data becomes available. For example, in 1984, 2200 smaller U.S. stocks were added to the data base. Thus, in this phase of the value-added chain, the computer is a powerful support tool, leveraging, through its extraordinary search capabilities, the time of the senior professional.
-8- To summarize this example, Batterymarch had an idea; 1) a contrarian approach to investment management --their implementation was feasible because they were able to utilize information technology to analyze and manage the large amounts of data required to construct and execute a strategy and 2) that information technology could be used to integrate the value-added chain components into a much tighter configuration than was traditional in the investment management business.
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE TO DATE
A number of papers have been written on the application of information technology to secure strategic advantage. These papers all provide frameworks, or more appropriately, search strategies, to help the business practitioner determine possibilities for strategic advantage application in his own company. These papers have typically been based on two complementary models; market positioning and the value added chain. The value added chain can be analyzed to determine which activities can most influence the firm's cost of production or its ability to differentiate product.
These then become the critical elements in the value added chain and can be used to fashion competitive strategy through focusing on differentiation or low cost of production.
Scott Morton and Rockart [181 developed a model for information technology and organizational change (see Figure 3 ) based on Chandler's conclusion [91 that "strategy drives structure," and Leavitt's [141 parallel notion that organizations can be thought of as maintaining balance of several components (tasks, people, technology, and structure). Their model suggests that information technology is a key enabler of strategic direction and that an important problem is to find the linkage between strategic ideas and the application of information technology.
-10- We suggest that opportunities for strategic advantage can be found by a two tiered iterative process as shown in Figure 4 . Tier 1 is the the linkage of a strategic idea with the possibilities opened by information technology as, for example, Batterymarch's contrarian approach to managing money where the technology enabled portfolio strategists to effectively scan vast amounts of security data. In the hands of an "excellent" executive, it is the linkage of the strategic idea with the enabling technology that sets the strategic application and leader into motion.
What was not feasible yesterday is technically and economically feasible today. Two properties of the ever improving technology are important to consider:
1. The ability to improve the interconnection between people, organizations, and processes, and the ability to provide complete and timely data base access to all the above.
-12-2. The rapidly improving capital intensity ratio of the information technology enables new application opportunities to be exploited every three to four years.
As the technology cost performance changes, an application moves from an unfeasible economic state to one where it is affordable in terms of productivity or market advantage. Thus the organization must ever be alert to new possiblities and ready to reject outmoded "it can't be done " attitudes.
INTEGRATION CHAIN
The second tier can be described as the integration chain. Engineering/Manufacturing: The integration of both the design drawing and the manufacturing bill of materials with the integrated geometry (design and build) data base is causing rapid change in engineering and manufacturing organizations with respect to both process change and organizational design. The strategic idea enabled by the cost performance of the computer assisted design workstations, was that one inventory of design data could be used to provide access for operational tasks and managerial control to all the parties involved in the design process, thus providing an opportunity for reduced costs, shorter design cycles, and higher quality designs. The integrated geometry data base is at the heart of the technology and process change taking place in these functions, notably computer assisted design, engineering and manufacturing, as well as robotics and factory automation: The resultant change is shortening the product development cycle, reducing costs, and improving quality of finished product, providing benefits to both the manufacturer and the customer. interconnection and improved, shared data accessibility. Given these facts, some key conclusions can be drawn:
1. Companies must understand that improved capital equivalency ratio is not a short term aberration. It has been happening for several decades now and will continue for several more. For those companies that do not truly understand the consequences of this economic driver it may only be a matter of time before the Swiss watch industry phenomenon overtakes them. 3. The search strategy presented in this paper can serve two managerial purposes.
First it can be used as a filter to evaluate and sharpen strategic advantage applications that are currently in the discussion stage. Second, we believe it can be used to develop a process for strategic application scans within the organization. Our future research plans to test this hypothesis. However, it is
already clear that what is called for is nothing less than the development of new mindsets. Line management must conceive of information as an exploitable asset and information technology as a form of capital to be aggressively invested in. For the information technologist, the mindset shift is to conceive the full panoply of information technologies as being important only insofar as they support important business needs. One major research task is to understand the nature of the process that will facilitate the linkage between the technological idea and the business goal.
At the very least, one can clearly assert that integration enabled by technology will be a major business force in the years ahead. 
